

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILLIAM J. PERRY  
PRESS CONFERENCE  
STUTTGART, GERMANY  
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It is a special pleasure for me and a privilege for me to be able to speak to you today on this German National Day of Unity. I know the significance of this day to all Germans.

I've spent the last week reviewing U.S. and NATO security issues in Europe. It's been a very good trip. I met with NATO defense ministers, the UNPROFOR commanders, and with the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Joulwan. We have made considerable progress on issues ranging from NATO expansion, the Partnership for Peace, to NATO operations in support of the United Nations in Bosnia.

Tonight I'm going to have dinner with my four star commanders in Europe. They'll tell me how they're meeting the challenges of drawing down U.S. strength while maintaining morale and quality of life for our troops in Europe. Tomorrow I will visit some of the 100,000 U.S. military personnel who remain in Europe. They're here as a tangible sign of our commitment to NATO's role in enhancing U.S. security.

Let me start off by discussing conversations I had with my fellow defense ministers at our meeting in Seville on Thursday and Friday of last week. Because the meeting was held in Spain and because it was attended by my French colleague, Francois Leotard, we discussed new security issues along NATO's Southern Flank. We also reviewed the important contributions made by the Partnership for Peace program in widening the European security network. And we discussed the relationship between the Partnership for Peace and future expansion of NATO. While we have set no time table for NATO expansion, we did discuss the process by which partners can become fully integrated members of NATO and the European Union.

Yesterday, I addressed the first class of Eastern European military and civilian personnel at the Marshall Center in Garmisch. I found it personally very moving to be able to talk with these bright young officers from countries such as Poland, Russia, and Romania who are now learning about how democracies manage their militaries. The Marshall Center is just one sign of the increasing

cooperation between East and West that gives me hope for a future that is as promising for its stability as the past was troubling for its instability.

As you know, this morning I flew to Split in Croatia to meet with United Nations officials in Bosnia. It was a long and constructive meeting at which I described to them the discussions held by the NATO defense ministers in Seville which had to deal with the most effective use of NATO air power in support of United Nations operations in Bosnia. We agreed that the current peace plan offers the best hope for settling the dispute in Bosnia and that we must keep pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to accept that plan.

I explained to them that in our meeting in Spain the NATO defense ministers agreed that NATO air strikes should be used to respond firmly and quickly to any provocation by the Bosnian Serbs. Tomorrow, NATO's permanent representatives will begin meeting in Brussels to flesh out its guidance to the United Nations. Air strikes will continue to be launched with what we call a two-key concept which means that both the NATO commander and the U.N. commander must agree on a strike. NATO governments will ask the United Nations to clarify the circumstances which would be considered provocation by the Bosnian Serbs and, therefore, subject to air strikes. They will also ask them to make it clear that NATO pilots should be authorized to seek multiple targets as part of a firm and a timely response to any provocation.

U.N. officials welcomed my explanation of NATO's thinking and reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining pressure on the Bosnian Serbs in order to push them toward acceptable peace terms. Those introductory comments -- I will be happy to accept questions from you. I'll do my best to see if I can answer them.

Q. Mr. Perry, I understand (inaudible) that you said the Bosnian Serbs could expect NATO in the future to be more forthright, to be more compelling in the use of force. Is that correct?

SECRETARY PERRY: This is my expectation. That is correct. This was the decision taken by the defense ministers. This decision, you understand, must go to the nations' capitals and they will then make their recommendations to the U.N. headquarters in New York. The U.N. then will offer guidance to the UNPROFOR commanders on the ground. The purpose of my meeting today, was to arrange a direct communication between NATO and the UNPROFOR so that I could explain in considerable detail not only what the conclusions were of the defense ministers,

but the rationale, the reasoning behind those ministers so that we could gain the understanding of the UNPROFOR commanders.

Q. It seems, Sir, that President Clinton wants to wave a big missile stick, but the U.N. and General Rose seem to be cool to it so far from what we hear today. Can it work?

SECRETARY PERRY: First of all, this is not just President Clinton. What I was describing to you was the consensus of all of the defense ministers of NATO and, in particular, we expect the national capitals to take this consensus and recommendation to U.N. headquarters. It is very important that we get convergence between the United Nations and NATO on how we conduct the operations in Bosnia. NATO is there in support of the U.N. ground operation. We are not an independent operation. Therefore, there has to be convergence and agreement on that matter.

Now, this morning at Split, the purpose, as I said, was to have clear communication and clear understanding between NATO and UNPROFOR, but neither I nor Mr. Akashi are in a position to make final judgments on these matters. That will come in the guidance that the United Nations gives to UNPROFOR. On the other hand, the judgment of NATO as to what constitutes an effective air response is very clear at this point, and we've made quite a precise description of the conditions in which we are willing to conduct air strikes so that they can be most effective. Just to summarize for you, there must be timely response to provocation. That's a first, very important point. Secondly, that they be done without warning, and third, that they be multiple targets, selected so that the air crew has the flexibility to select particular targets, or targets struck, based on the weather and terrain conditions existing at the time of the strike. These are the conditions for making an effective air strike, and these are the conditions which NATO, prior to carrying out the strike, establishes their conditions.

Q. Sir, can I take from what you've said that you, Mr. Akashi, and General Rose were all in total agreement as to these conditions should apply?

SECRETARY PERRY: I don't want to speak for Mr. Akashi, but I'll give you my impression of what we agreed upon. First of all, we did agree that the current peace plan, which was proposed by the Contact Group, should be the basis upon which all of the discussions proceed and the basis around which we would evaluate the effectiveness of the U.N. actions. Secondly, that in order to have success in

that peace plan, there needed to be additional pressure brought upon the Bosnian Serbs in as much as the other parties have accepted that peace plan. Third, that NATO air strikes were an important part of that pressure. All of those points we agreed on. Now, the specifics of how they should be implemented tactically, the UNPROFOR commanders and Mr. Akashi did agree upon the importance of the timeliness; they agreed that there should be, if no warning, at least very minimal warning; and they agreed on the desirability of having multiple targets without committing themselves to selecting multiple targets in every instance.

There was, I think, a (inaudible) convergence of views in the course of this meeting. I made it very clear that NATO is not seeking to conduct a broad air campaign, that they were not seeking to conduct preemptive attacks, but rather only attacks in response to provocations, to defiant provocations that violated already established resolutions. And finally, I made it clear that we were fully prepared to maintain the two-key arrangement. All of that gave them considerable comfort because, based on some media reports, they had thought perhaps we were proposing more ambitious than in fact what we are proposing.

It has to be very clear that air strikes in support of ground forces require very close coordination between the ground forces and the air (inaudible), and my visit was the purpose of establishing clear communications which would facilitate that communication in the future. General Joulwan was with me on the visit, so we had an opportunity to have the military authority who represented NATO meeting with the military authorities representing UNPROFOR.

Q. You talk about the Bosnian Serbs -- can you tell us what role Mr. Milosevic, with the Serbs in the main part of Yugoslavia are supposed to play in the future?

SECRETARY PERRY: I didn't fully understand the question. Can you repeat it?

Q. Could you tell us which role Mr. Milosevic is going to play in this Bosnian conflict in the future -- in your opinion, whether he's a partner for the future or more of an ex-criminal to you?

SECRETARY PERRY: That's a very good question and we did discuss that question this morning. Both in our NATO meetings in Spain and at the meeting with UNPROFOR this morning, we agreed on the importance of the Serbian government cutting off the flow of war material to the Bosnian Serbs. This is a very important way of putting additional pressure on the Bosnian Serb government to

make them accept the peace plan. We believe that the Serbian government is anxious to see the Bosnian Serbs comply and agree to the peace plan for a variety of reasons, but I suppose most importantly, because they would like to be relieved of the sanctions which are now damaging the economy of Serbia.

I have some concern that, first of all, it's very difficult to shut off that flow of materials over the long border, and an uncontrolled border in places. Secondly, whether the Serbian government will fully carry out their promise to cut off those supplies, and therefore, while we are anxious for that to happen, and while we want to work with the Serbian government to verify that that's happening, I do not believe that we can depend upon that happening. Therefore, it is equally important to maintain the pressure on the Bosnian Serbs -- to come from a robust program of air strikes. So there are two different ways of applying pressure: cutting off the flow of war material from Serbia and maintaining air strikes. I believe it's important to maintain pressure on both of those areas, and not to count on just one.

Q. I just want to call on my previous question. Can you give us a scenario in which you (inaudible) the Serbs will give you sufficient provocation, for example, blocking aid convoys, which they previously agreed to allow through -- threatening to shoot down planes trying to get into Sarajevo -- would those be scenarios in which you (inaudible) provocation for you?

SECRETARY PERRY: There are really a wide variety of scenarios that are carefully called out in the U.N. resolutions on this subject. They fall under two broad categories, one of which could be called "strangulation" of Sarajevo and other safe areas and the other, which is harassment, of the U.N. forces or humanitarian supply organizations in Bosnia. In the second case, the harassment of the convoys and of the U.N. peacekeeping forces, the appropriate response is close air support, and when the UNPROFOR commander calls for close air support, NATO is prepared to provide that. That is specifically responsive to the particular attack that is underway and designed to relieve the military pressure on the ground forces that are receiving it.

The second is very different and it's the strangulation and there are wide variety of specific ways in which the Bosnian Serbs have tried to effect a strangulation of Sarajevo as well as other safe haven areas. These have involved shutting off the utilities into Sarajevo. Shutting down the airport. Attacking planes to shut down the airport. Stopping the convoys from bringing relief supplies into the city. And the judgment that has to be made in this case by the UNPROFOR

ground commander, as to when any one particular violation is sufficiently egregious to call for air strikes, which are designed to respond to those provocations. We discussed that issue in some detail this morning, and we have asked that individual nations, the United States, France, Britain, Germany, will offer guidance to the United Nations' Secretary General on the way in which those violations should be regarded. That will then result, we believe, in guidance to UNPROFOR on how to make those judgments. The ultimate decision has to lie with the ground commander of UNPROFOR and we don't question that for a moment.

Q. A question on behalf of some of the troops that you will be visiting tomorrow. Our soldiers, sailors and airmen have sworn to protect and defend the constitution. They've also come to terms personally with laying down their lives for their country. What are you asking them to do in the former Yugoslavia?

SECRETARY PERRY: Asking them to do what?

Q. These individual troops. They've come to terms with the idea of laying down their own lives for their own country. What is it that you are asking these boys and young women to do an ocean and half a continent away from their own country?

SECRETARY PERRY: Here, in Germany, in particular?

Q. I'm talking about the possibility that they'll be going into Bosnia-Herzegovina?

SECRETARY PERRY: We have a whole set of national security objectives in the United States that our military force is designed to help us achieve. Some of them are easy to understand. During the Cold War they were all easy to understand because there our military forces were designed to prevent a war that could threaten the survival of the United States. We see only a few situations in the world today -- national security problems that threaten the survival of the United States. A resurgence of militarism, were that to happen, could cause that kind of a challenge. An emergence of the nuclear weapon program in North Korea, could threaten the survival of one our allies, South Korea. The failure of integration of the East and West in Europe would pose a comparable problem. Our military force has always been designed as its first priority to deal with those national security challenges which threaten the survival of the United States.

Those are not the only national security problems that we have. Those are not the only problem in which the United States has a national security interest. Bosnia is, I think, a very good example of a security problem which does not threaten the survival of the United States, but still is a national security problem in which we have a very substantial interest.

Let me define two specific aspects of this interest. The first is that it is a test of NATO's ability and the U.N.'s ability to deal with security challenges in this new era. When there is an ethnic or religious struggle which culminates in violence, tens of thousands or even hundreds of thousands of people were killed, and there's a danger of that war spreading -- so the first national security interest of the United States in Bosnia is doing what we can to prevent the war in Bosnia from spreading beyond the borders of Bosnia. That's why we have troops in Macedonia, for example. The most effective way of achieving that objective is to get that war stopped. That's why a major part of our effort is a design to bring about the conclusion of the peace plan that is being proposed by the Contact Group.

The other national security interest we have in Bosnia has to do with the fact that while this is not a religious war, it nevertheless has Muslims on one side of the ethnic conflict going on in that country, and I believe we have a substantial security interest in seeing that this does not turn into a religious war. That it does not become a test of whether some of the extremists in countries like Iran and Iraq could gain control of the conflict there and change the nature of it. So we have a national interest in preventing that war from spreading in those two different kinds of ways. One by spreading geographically over the Balkans, and the other by spreading into becoming a war with a religious fanaticism tied to it. Those interests are felt even more strongly in Europe, but they also effect the national security interest of the United States.

Thank you very much.

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## Americans will 'rally' behind forces in Haiti, Perry predicts

By RON JENSEN  
Nürnberg bureau

GRAFENWÖHR, Germany — The American public's opposition to U.S. military involvement in Haiti will soon fade, Secretary of Defense William Perry predicted Tuesday. "I think the American people will rally to the support of the American forces there," Perry said. "This has been a military operation done with great skill."

Recent polls have shown wide disfavor for Operation Restore Democracy. Currently, more than 20,000 U.S. servicemen are in the island nation attempting to preserve order and establish security for the Oct. 15 return of elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

Perry noted that Haitians had died since the American occupation began, but, he said, Haiti has long been a violent place. He said he didn't have statistics, but

guessed that fewer Haitians died during the first week of the occupation than died the week before.

Perry made his comments during brief interviews with The Stars and Stripes and American Forces Network during an afternoon tour of the Army training facility in Grafenwöhr.

Perry also said that discussions were taking place to improve the quality of life in Europe, namely by dealing with the increased number of deployments and exercises that separate servicemen from their families.

Five years ago, he noted, Europe was a tour in which soldiers trained for a war with the Soviet Union.

"Now, Europe has become a forward deployment from which (a servicemember) goes to deployments and exercises," he said.

One possibility to change that, he said, is to use the National Guard and Army Reserve forces for some of those exercises and deployments.

Perry had lunch with 30 soldiers who have been on those deployments, from Africa and Macedonia to Poland and Russia.

Perry said his counterparts in many of those countries have told him that members of the U.S. forces are good ambassadors. Pfc. Aaron Mobley of Hq Co, 1st Armd Div, in Bad Kreuznach, sat at the secretary's right. Mobley had deployed to Africa as part of Operation Continue Hope.

"I think it's nice that he took time to come down here and have lunch with the smaller people," Mobley said.

The secretary also took time to promote a soldier. Pfc. Antonio Costa of the 2nd Bn, 68th Armd Regt, in Baumholder, stood at attention while the secretary promoted him to specialist. "I can remember the date I got that promotion," Perry told Costa while shaking the soldier's hand.



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# Perry is told peace takes toll

## Bottle, beatings hurting Air Force

By John Diamond  
ASSOCIATED PRESS

SPANGDAHLEM AIR BASE, Germany — It was supposed to be the standard slide presentation by the general for the VIP from the Pentagon. Instead, Defense Secretary William Perry got an earful about the strains of military life in an era of defense cutbacks.

Pilots are overworked and undertrained, he was told. Spousal and alcohol abuse are increasing. Child abuse, too.

"Should I be concerned, or deeply concerned?" Mr. Perry asked Brig. Gen. John Dallager yesterday after being told that 21 of 23 air combat controllers had been unable to meet training requirements and needed waivers to remain on duty.

Mr. Perry, a mathematician and high-tech entrepreneur who has been in office eight months, visited Spangdahlem during a European tour undertaken in connection with NATO meetings.

The base is eight miles east of Bitburg, in western Germany near the Belgian border.

Gen. Dallager, commander of a fighter wing, told Mr. Perry that reports of spousal abuse among the base's 11,915 civilian and military personnel are up 9 percent in the past year.

Child abuse is up 20 percent, he said; alcohol abuse is up 11 percent.

Pilot training, he said, has declined sharply, and so has readi-

ness to fight a war.

The general showed slides, all right, but they involved the human strains of meeting the base's commitments.

The general told the secretary about Tony and Louisa Clift, both senior airmen. They are getting out of the Air Force because they are so often apart.

He told about Capt. Timothy J. Hogan, an A-10 fighter-bomber pilot who spent nearly two-thirds of the past 22 months deployed away from the base and his family. Capt. Hogan's wife, Linda, told an Air Force interviewer she feels like a single parent.

Gen. Dallager conceded that the increases in reported violence and other domestic problems could be the result of better monitoring now that the base is "starting to take care of people."

But the pressure that constant deployments put on training is beyond question, Gen. Dallager said.

Air units from the base protect the Kurdish population in northern Iraq, patrol the skies over Bosnia and provide logistics experts to the Rwanda relief mission — all cutting into the time pilots and controllers need to keep up with training, he said.

Poor weather in Germany frequently forces the pilots to go to bases in the United States for a month or two to stay current with the latest skills and technologies.

Gen. Dallager said that the crews are still capable, but that the trend in training is in the wrong direction.

Mr. Perry could offer no assurances of change.

"That trend will continue as long as we have these operations," he said. "Since we're not going to get an increased force structure, there are two options: We can reduce our operations tempo or we can use the Guard and Reserves to supplement missions."

For most of the past 40 years, this base has been on the front line of the Cold War. If one of the nightmare scenarios of that era had developed — an invasion of the West by Soviet forces — pilots at Spangdahlem would have been among the first into combat.